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Abstract: Creating a rice marketing system has been one of the central policy issues in 
Myanmar’s move to a market economy since the end of the 1980s. Two liberalizations of rice 
marketing were implemented in 1987 and 2003. This paper examines the essential aspects of 
the liberalizations and the subsequent transformation of Myanmar’s rice marketing sector. It 
attempts to bring into clearer focus the rationale of the government’s rice marketing reforms 
which is to maintain a stable supply of rice at a low price to consumers. Under this rationale,
however, the state rice marketing sector continued to lose efficiency while the private sector 
was allowed to develop on condition that it did not jeopardize the rationale of stable supply 
at low price. The paper concludes that the prospect for the future development of the private 
rice marketing sector is dim since a change in the rice market’s rationale is unlikely. Private 
rice exporting is unlikely to be permitted, while the domestic market is approaching the 
saturation point. Thus, there is little momentum for the private rice sector to undertake any
substantial expansion of investment. 
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Introduction 
Creating a rice1 marketing system to serve the national interest has been one of the central 
policy issues for the Myanmar government since independence. The importance of rice for food 
security as well as a source of government revenues and foreign exchange earnings have been 
the major factors for the historical priority placed on rice. It is the leading staple food in 
Myanmar, and the per capita rice consumption of 180 kg per year (Thein Myint 1997, p.7) 
clearly indicates the extremely high dependency of the Myanmar people on rice, even when 
compared with neighboring Asian countries. For this reason successive Myanmar governments 
have put great political importance on ensuring a stable supply of rice as a key to maintaining 
the stability of the regime (Mya Maung 1998, p.109). Under the socialist government that came 
to power in 1962, a comprehensive system of controls over rice marketing was established for 
the first time which introduced a rice ration system for consumers along with a compulsory 
delivery system for procuring paddy directly from farmers to support the ration system. At the 
same time the exportation of rice became a state monopoly and served as the regime’s main 
source for earning foreign exchange. Thus it is no exaggeration to say that agricultural policy in 
Myanmar is synonymous with rice policy. 
The implementation of agricultural marketing liberalization began in the late 1980s 
starting with the domestic agricultural market which was liberalized from September 1987. This 
move signaled the start of Myanmar’s transition to a market economy. A year later, in October 
1988, the ban on the private export of agricultural produce was lifted (Okamoto 2001), and 
thereafter the marketing of some crops enjoyed full liberalization. However, the marketing of 
rice, which was basically the main target of agricultural reform, remained under state control. 
The rice ration system was maintained for the public servants and the paddy procurement 
system, which had been terminated in 1987, were revived in 1989. Further, rice exporting 
                                                  
1 In this paper rice means both paddy and milled rice. When a distinction is necessary, the terms paddy or 
milled rice are used. 
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 remained a government monopoly with responsibility taken over by Myanmar Agricultural 
Produce Trading (MAPT).2 This period of reform can be called the first liberalization. 
In April 2003, 16 years after the first liberalization, another liberalization of rice 
marketing was suddenly announced. Under this second liberalization the rice ration system for 
the civil servants and the paddy procurement system were finally abolished. Initially, the private 
exporting of rice was also incorporated into the reform plan and the foreign exchange earnings 
were to be divided equally between the government and the private sector. However, this part of 
the plan was not implemented when abolition of the rice rationing system was announced in 
January 2004. This second liberalization can be viewed as an epoch-making reform which has 
brought about the comprehensive liberalization of the domestic rice market 40 years after the 
establishment of Myanmar’s socialist regime. However, the aftermath of the second 
liberalization also shows that the government is still not ready to undertake full-scale rice export 
deregulation. 
The institutional changes and current state of Myanmar’s rice marketing system have yet 
to be fully explored. Takahashi (2000), Okamoto (1993), MOAI (2000) and U Tin Htut Oo and 
Kudo (2003) provide overviews of the rice marketing system after the first liberalization. 
However, these studies limit their discussions to overviews of the institutional changes and do 
not analyze the development process of the marketing system or the interrelationship between 
the state and the private marketing sector. Therefore, the emphasis of this paper is on describing 
the transformation of the rice marketing system in greater detail and depth. Through this closer 
examination, this study seeks to bring into clearer focus the rationale of the government’s rice 
marketing reforms and to explore the significance of liberalizations in the light of developments 
Myanmar’s rice marketing sector. Two points in particular will be examined to evaluate the 
transformation of the rice marketing system: 1) the way the state marketing sector was 
                                                  
2 The government institution responsible for rice marketing has been reorganized and renamed several 
times. MAPT came into being following reorganization of the AFPTC (Agricultural Farm Produce 
Trading Corporation) in 1989. See Okamoto (1993). 
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 maintained and the characteristics it came to have after the first liberalization, and 2) the way 
the state sector has influenced the development of the private sector. However, it is still too 
early to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the second liberalization, and only a provisional 
assessment will be attempted in this paper. 
Section 1, which follows, describes the features of the state marketing sector after the first 
liberalization along with presenting the background and underlying factors of the reform and its 
problems. Section 2 explores the development of the private marketing sector and the problems 
it has faced. Section 3 examines the significance of the second liberalization, and the findings of 
this study are summed up in the concluding section. 
 
1. The First Liberalization and Transformation of the State Rice Marketing Sector 
1.1 The System after the First Liberalization 
The essential components of the rice marketing system of the socialist period were the 
rice rationing system for consumers, the paddy procurement system that supported the rationing 
system, and the state monopoly on rice exporting. This section will look at how the first 
liberalization changed these three particular systems. 
 
a. The Rice Rationing System 
The rice rationing system targeting general consumers was abolished with the first 
liberalization,3 and the system was limited to targeting the so-called Budget Group ( or Target 
Group) which consisted of civil servants and military personnel. This substantially reduced the 
number of people targeted for rice rations which decreased the volume of rationed rice to 
0.6-0.8 million tons in normal years. This was a decrease of 1 million tons compared to the 
volume rationed in the socialist period (Table 1). Sixty percent of the total rationed rice was for 
                                                  
3 Until 1994 rice was rationed to some general consumers in rice deficit area through cooperatives. 
However, the amount was quite limited. 
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 public servants, 30% for the military, and the rest went to special institutions such as hospitals.4
 
Table 1 Changes in the Volume of Rationed Rice
(in thousand tons)
 Rice Coverted in Paddy
1980/81 4,259 1,618 3,236 76.0
1983/84 4,145 1,709 3,418 82.5
1987/88 564 574 1,148 203.5
1988/89 1,672 556 1,112 66.5
1989/90 1,482 869 1,738 117.2
1990/91 1,851 751 1,502 81.1
1991/92 2,095 616 1,232 58.8
1992/93 2,222 770 1,540 69.3
1993/94 1,939 711 1,421 73.3
1994/95 2,034 744 1,487 73.1
1995/96 1,934 769 1,539 79.5
1996/97 1,522 822 1,643 108.0
1997/98 1,601 773 1,546 96.6
1998/99 2,200 668 1,336 60.7
1999/2000 2,212 616 1,232 55.7
2000/2001 2,126 585 1,169 55.0
2001/2002 2,119 569 1,137 53.7
Notes:
1. The conversion rate from paddy into rice is 50%. 
2. For 1979/80～1994/95, procurement includes that by cooperative.
Sources:
Procurement　volumes from: REFS  various issues and MAPT documents
Rationed volumes for 1980/81,83/84 from:　MAPT (2003, p.222-23)
for 1987/88-92/93 from:　Ko Ko Gyi  (1994, Table 5)
for 1993/1994-2001/02 from:　MAPT documents
Volume of Paddy
Procured
Rationed Rice % of Rationed
Volume in
Procured Volume
 
 
Under the rice ration system of the socialist period, general consumers were eligible to 
receive 12.6 kg (6 pyi5) monthly per adult and 6.3 kg (3 pyi) per child under 12 years old (Mya 
Than and Nishizawa 1990, p.104).6 Assuming that the per capita consumption for an adult was 
                                                  
4 MAPT. 
5 1pyi equals 2.1kg. 
6 These figures are based on information from government officials. Rice farmers were not targeted for 
rationed rice. Instead, they were allowed to deduct the paddy for home consumption from the calculation 
of their paddy procurement obligation. But those farming less than three acres were eligible for rationed 
rice. Rice was provided by the people’s shops in the initial stage and by consumer cooperatives at later 
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 180 kg per year, as it is at present, 84% of annual consumption would have been covered by the 
ration system, which can be regarded as quite a sufficient amount. Moreover, the average price 
of rationed rice remained at about 50% of the free market price for the period of 
1962/63-1986/87, and for the decade from 1978, the price was kept unchanged.7 This means 
that consumers were sufficiently protected in terms of food security. 
After the first liberalization, the volume of rationed rice for the Budget Group was 
changed to 25 kg (12 pyi) per month for an unmarried adult and 28 kg (14 pyi) for a married 
adult. This was a sufficient amount for an individual adult, but depending on the size of a 
household, the amount of rationed rice decreased compared to that of the socialist period. 
However, the price of rationed rice was kept at 21% of the free market price on average for the 
period of 1988-2001,8 and some ministries and organizations even provided the rice to their 
personnel for free.9 Therefore, it can be said that the price was kept low in order to compensate 
for the decrease in the amount of rationed rice compared to that of the socialist period. 
 
b. The Paddy Procurement System 
With the decrease in the volume of rationed rice, the paddy procurement system that supplied 
the rice was scaled back as well. A procurement quota was set for paddy produced in the 
monsoon season (monsoon paddy), but it was decreased to 10-12 baskets10/acre (0.5-0.6 tons 
                                                                                                                                                  
stage. In addition to that, government officials were eligible to the special rationed rice “Project rice” in 
the case they were members of any government projects.  
7 Saito and Lee Kin Kiong (1998, p.98). The price of rationed rice differs depending on whether a 
location is categorized as a rice deficit or rice surplus area. For example, the price difference between 
Mandalay and Yangon is 10% (MAPT, 2003, p.222-225). Meanwhile the free market price difference 
between the two cities is 30%-80% (Okamoto 2003, p.174), indicating that deficit areas are given special 
consideration.  
8 Calculated based on Monthly Economic Indicators (various issues) and MAPT (2000, p.260). 
9 Some ministries having a relatively good financial footing provided their own subsidies for rice. In 1996, 
when there was a sudden jump in the price, rice was rationed to all public workers for free (Mya Maung 
1998, p.113). 
10 1basket of paddy equals 20.9kg. 
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 per hector) from the 30-40 basket/acre (1.5-2.1 tons per hector) of the socialist period. 
Consequently, the volume of rice procured by the government as a share of total rice production 
decreased by one-third after liberalization (Table 2). 
 
　Table 2.  Estimated Volume of Domestically Marketed Paddy Rice (in thousand tons)
A
Production
Procured
Volume
Ratio
（％） Seed Waste
Home
Consumpt
ion
Volume Ratio（％）
Milled
Rice
Converted
to Paddy
as a % of
Procure-
ment
as a % of
Produc-
tion
b b/A   C/A ｄ d／b d／Ａ
1971/72 8189 2245 27.4 514 514 7528 (1585) (31.9) 831 1240 55.3 15.1
1976/77 9335 2889 30.9 524 524 7538 (2140) (22.9) 646 964 33.4 10.3
1980/81 13340 4259 31.9 530 530 7384 637 4.8 703 1049 24.6 7.9
1981/82 14170 4355 30.7 527 527 7402 1358 9.6 701 1046 24.0 7.4
1982/83 14397 4111 28.6 504 504 7395 1882 13.1 711 1061 25.8 7.4
1983/84 14312 4145 29.0 499 499 7413 1756 12.3 906 1352 32.6 9.4
1984/85 14279 3731 26.1 508 508 7406 2126 14.9 634 946 25.4 6.6
1985/86 14341 4156 29.0 506 506 7354 1818 12.7 594 887 21.3 6.2
1986/87 14150 4263 30.1 500 500 7363 1523 10.8 604 901 21.1 6.4
1987/88 13658 564 4.1 482 482 7402 4728 34.6 320 478 84.7 3.5
1988/89 13186 1672 12.7 494 494 7447 3080 23.4 48 72 4.3 0.5
1989/90 13826 1482 10.7 504 504 7551 3785 27.4 169 252 17.0 1.8
1990/91 13748 1851 13.5 511 511 7579 3296 24.0 134 200 10.8 1.5
1991/92 12993 2095 16.1 499 499 7589 2312 17.8 183 273 13.0 2.1
1992/93 14603 2222 15.2 530 530 7648 3672 25.1 199 297 13.4 2.0
1993/94 15500 1939 12.5 587 587 7694 4693 30.3 261 390 20.1 2.5
1994/95 17908 2034 11.4 613 613 7737 6911 38.6 1041 1554 76.4 8.7
1995/96 17669 1934 10.9 634 634 7772 6695 37.9 354 528 27.3 3.0
1996/97 17397 1522 8.7 607 607 7810 6852 39.4 93 139 9.1 0.8
1997/98 16391 1601 9.8 597 597 7829 5765 35.2 28 42 2.6 0.3
1998/99 16808 2200 13.1 607 607 7869 5524 32.9 120 179 8.1 1.1
1999/2000 20159 2212 11.0 649 649 7908 8741 43.4 69 103 4.7 0.5
2000/2001 21359 2126 10.0 657 657 7948 9972 46.7 257 384 18.0 1.8
Notes:  
1.　Seed and waste are assumed to be 2 baskets per acre.
2. Home consumpion is calcurated as the number of households×5.5（the average number of people per household in 1999) ×15 baskets.
For 1998/99-99/2000 the data for farm households are not available; therefore consumption was estimated 
using the average increase in the rate of households. 
3. Exports include both white rice and broken rice. 
4. The paddy conversion rate for exports is assumed to be 67%.
Sources: 
number of farm households from: RFES , various issues
procurement volumes: same as Table 1
production and sown acreage from:　Agricultural Statistics , 1998/99-2000/01 and　MAS
exports from: Statistical Yearbook  1991, 1998, 2001, 　Tin Htut Oo & Kudo ed. Table 15.
Ｂ C=A-B D
Deductions Marketed Volume Exports
 
 
Although the farmers’ quota obligations were reduced, the paddy procurement system 
itself essentially unchanged from that of the socialist period. In normal years farmers were 
obliged to conclude procurement contracts with MAPT before the monsoon rice planting season 
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 and received the price in advance (Okamoto 2005, p.168). The procurement price paid under 
this system was kept at 40%-60% of the prevailing free market price as in the socialist period. 
c. Rice Export System 
Although the ban on the private export of agricultural produce such as pulses was lifted in 
1988, rice exporting remained the monopoly of MAPT. The government’s priority was on 
securing rice for rationing, and only the rice remaining in government hands after rationing was 
released for export. Consequently, only an extremely small amount of rice was exported when 
compared with the socialist period (Table 2). 
One result of the government’s monopoly over rice exporting has been the separation of 
the domestic and international markets which has led to a huge disparity between the domestic 
and international price of rice. The domestic rice price at the free market foreign exchange rate 
was 60% of the international price on average after the first liberalization. It even fell to 40% 
when the domestic price collapsed in 2000-01. The international price of rice has been trending 
downward over the past two decades, but the Myanmar government has kept the price of 
domestic rice well below even the declining international level. 
 
1.2 Background and Determining Factors of the First Liberalization 
This section will turns to the background and determining factors of the first liberalization. 
The important fact is that rice in Myanmar is a political commodity. The government has always 
seen the stable supply of rice at a low price as a very important factor for avoiding political 
disturbances, and the reform measures were designed with this factor in mind. 
There were basically two problems that led to the first liberalization. One was the 
government’s growing fiscal deficit. As noted earlier, the ration system of the socialist period 
was for consumers in general. Thus as the population increased over the years, the fiscal burden 
of rationing continued to expand. This can be seen in MAPT’s balance sheet figures which 
registered a peak surplus in 1982/83 of 200 million kyats, but which dropped sharply thereafter 
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 recording a deficit in 1985/86 of 220 million kyats.11 This fall suggests that it was virtually 
impossible for the government to raise its procurement price in response to the rising discontent 
of rice farmers against the procurement system. 
The second problem was the growing disinclination of farmers to produce rice. The paddy 
procurement system itself created a huge disincentive for farmers.12 The system had been 
revised several times during the socialist period, and by the mid 1980 it had become very severe 
on the farmers with the state absorbing their entire marketable surplus. Adding further to farmer 
stress was the low procurement price which remained unchanged from 1980/81 to 1986/87 
while the free market price doubled during the same period. Takahashi (1992, p. 93) saw this 
paddy procurement system as resting on the “good will (seidana)” of the farmers and “pressure” 
from the state. But from the beginning of the 1980s, there came to be only “pressure” which 
drove up farmer discontent and made them reluctant to cultivate rice. 
This discontent and reluctance peaked with the government’s failure to procure a sufficient 
supply of paddy at its low procurement price in 1986/87. This triggered government moves to 
reform Myanmar’s rice marketing policy. To deal with the skyrocketing free market rice price, 
the government introduced a new procurement scheme which bought paddy through 
cooperatives in an effort to assure a sufficient supply of rationed rice to consumers. Along with 
this the government issued yet another prohibition against the sale of rice on the black market in 
an effort to keep the rice price under control (Kawada 1988, p.8). However, neither of these 
moves achieved their aims, and it was starkly clear to everyone that the socialist rice marketing 
system with strong reliance on pressure and price controls had reached a dead end. 
The reason for modifying the rice marketing system soon after the broad-ranging 
                                                  
11 The figures were not only for rice. However, due to the overwhelming share of rice in the ration system, 
any increase/decrease in the volume of rationed rice had a substantial impact on MAPT’s balance sheet. 
Tin Soe (1994, p.21) pointed out that the deficit for rice procurement and rationing increased fivefold 
during the nine years from 1978/79 to 1986/87. 
12 See Saito (1979), Takahashi (1992), Tin Soe and Fisher (1990) for analyses of the procurement system 
in the socialist period. 
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 liberalization of agricultural marketing was also closely related to the need for the government 
to assure a stable supply of rice at a low price. Even though the rice rationing system for the 
general consumer was to be abandoned, that for the military and public workers was to be 
maintained to secure the political base of the regime. Initially it was planned to collect paddy for 
the rationed rice as land revenue from farmers and commercial taxes from traders.13 However, 
the new collection system became caught up in the movement for democracy in 1988 and did 
not function well with the result that the amount collected fell far short of requirement. The next 
year, following the crushing of the democracy movement, the government revived the paddy 
procurement system which had a very strong institutional base under the Socialist government. 
In a determined effort to achieve its procurement goals, the government sought to placate 
farmers by reducing the “pressure” of procuring while making efforts to obtain their “good will”. 
A clear indication of the government’s new approach was the initial labeling of paddy collected 
under this revised system as “good will paddy (Seidana zaba)” (Okamoto 1993, p.107).   
Along with this, the government monopoly on rice exporting was utilized as a measure to 
control the price of rice for the general consumer who was excluded from the rice ration system 
after the first liberalization. A general deregulation of private exporting was announced only two 
months after the peak of the democracy movement. But in the midst of the tense situation and 
fear of further instability, the government very much wanted to keep a stable rice price for 
general consumers, and it regarded the maintaining of its monopoly on rice exporting as one 
means to this end. Consequently, the decision to allow private rice exporting was shelved. 
In addition to this, it may be true that the government had another incentive for 
maintaining its monopoly on rice exporting: it was a direct source for earning foreign exchange. 
By exporting rice that had been procured at 25%-30% below the international price, the 
government could earn a huge profit from the price difference; and although the exported 
volume remained quite low, the foreign exchange earned per unit was large, giving the 
                                                  
13 Cabinet Council Notification30, September 1987 and Cabinet Council Directive 19 October 1987.  
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 government incentive to keep control over rice exports.  
In the late 1990s, when the domestic rice market had for the most part stabilized, the 
government apparently took a stronger interest in earning foreign exchange through rice exports. 
This is evident from the fact that despite the decrease of the total volume of rationed rice, the 
amount collected through the procurement system increased considerably (Table 1). If 
procurement was only for rice rationed to the Budget Group, there should not have been a need 
to expand the areas targeted for the procurement of rice which even included rice deficit areas. 
It is clear that the rice marketing system after the first liberalization continued to place 
priority on maintaining a stable supply of rice at a low price, and the underlying rationale of the 
system had not fundamentally changed since the socialist period. But why could this system be 
sustained for 16 years following the first liberalization? One reason was the shrinkage of the 
procurement system deficit when compared to the socialist period. According to MAPT, the 
deficit was 350 million kyats in 1986/87; this was turned into a surplus of 310 million kyats by 
1989/90.14 Another reason was the reduction in procurement quotas for farmers. Although not as 
large as the official statistics suggest (as will be discussed further in the next section), it is true 
that the reduced quota obligations increased the marketable surplus of paddy per farmer when 
compared with the amount they could hold under the strict system in the socialist period. This 
increase, though it was not remarkable for every farmer, eased to some extent the disparity 
between the government procurement price and free market price which made more farmers to 
continue and expand rice production. 
 
1.3 Problems in the State Marketing Sector after the First Liberalization 
As already pointed out, the main policy objective of the state rice marketing sector after 
                                                  
14 According to later MAPT documents, it appears that the deficit increased again from the mid 1990s, 
and especially at the end of the 1990s. It is possible that this increase was because of a rise in the 
procurement volume. However, there is insufficient documentation to discuss the background and scale of 
the deficit in depth in this paper. 
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 the first liberalization was to maintain the stable supply of rice at a low price. For this purpose, 
the paddy procurement system, the rice ration system for the Budget Group, and the government 
monopoly on rice exporting were utilized as the major institutional tools. This section will 
discuss the problems in the state marketing sector through an examination of three areas: 1) the 
procurement process, 2) the milling stage, and 3) rationing and exporting. 
 
a. Problems in the Procurement Process 
Despite the official assertion that the burden of the paddy procurement system on farmers 
was eased, there were various problems in the procurement process. 
First, the amount procured was fixed on a per acre basis; thus farmers with lower 
productivity or less marketable surplus were at a disadvantage. Unlike the system in the socialist 
period that absorbed the farmers’ entire marketable surplus, the new system had the merit of 
inducing farmers to increase production. However, the demerit was that it did not reflect the 
disparity in the productivity of individual farmers or take into consideration reasons for 
fluctuations in yield, such as weather conditions. 
Second, as Figure 1 shows, the procurement price was only revised after the disparity 
between the market and official price became an obstacle to procuring paddy from farmers.  
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 Figure 1.　Changes in Procurement and Farmgate Prices
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This widening disparity in price is one reason to think that the real burden on farmers was not 
actually lessened to the extent that official statistics indicate.15  
A third problem is the likelihood of an upward bias in the production statistics as a 
negative consequence of the policy of aggressively increasing rice production. The real rice 
production level in some areas could have been less than the figures that appeared in the 
statistics since local administrators tended to overstate production, implying the real burden of 
farmers could have been much heavier than reported. 
A fourth problem was the rise in the cost transportation. Normally procurement took place 
at the procurement depots set up by MAPT in towns and village from October (the start of the 
                                                  
15 Considering that the procurement price was paid to farmers when they need money for cultivation, such 
as for rice planting, it has been argued that the system offered the farmers a kind of credit (Fujita 2003). 
However, since the government abolished the procurement system in 2003/04 and started providing 
advance payments, there has been less discontent among farmers indicating that the demerits of the 
procurement system were greater than the merits. 
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 harvest season) until March. Farmers had to deliver paddy to designated depots at their own cost. 
However, after liberalization the number of procurement depots decreased, and more often than 
not farmers had to deliver their paddy to more distant depots. This increased the burden of the 
farmers’ transportation costs (Takahashi 2000, p.191). 
Fifthly, there were additional cost that occurred at the procurement depots (Takahashi 
2005, p.56, 191), such as the frequent bribes demanded by MAPT staff. Sometimes the demands 
could be so flagrant that they led to arrests for exceeding even the tolerance of the authorities. 
To avoid his sort of extra cost at the depot, some farmers entrusted their deliveries of procured 
rice to special brokers who could better handle bargaining with MAPT staff. As an example of 
the cost for this service in 1999, farmers in a township in Yangon Division paid 8 baskets (8%) 
for the delivery of 100 baskets of procured paddy. In effect, this means that farmers were forced 
to bear larger costs if delivering their paddy to procurement depots on their own. 
A sixth problem was the enlargement of the areas targeted for the procurement of paddy 
which added to the burden of farmers in general. Looking at the percentage of procurement by 
area (Table 3), one would expect the rice surplus areas (Ayeyarwaddy, Bago and Yangon 
divisions and Mon State) to account for the larger share. However, the rice deficit areas (the rest 
of the divisions and states) also had their shares increased, especially from around 1993/94. 
Even though the procurement rate per farmer in the rice deficit areas was set lower than for the 
surplus areas, their share in actual terms increased in the 1990s. This was the result of stronger 
government pressure to increase rice production nationwide. Procurement quotas were raised 
even for those areas where the rice production was basically for home consumption with little 
marketable surplus. 
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 Table 3  Share of Paddy Procurement by Area (%)
1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1998/99 1999/2000
Rice Deficit Areas 12.9 11.0 21.2 16.6 22.4 28.1 18.7 25.0
Rice Surplus Areas 87.1 89.0 78.8 83.4 77.6 71.9 81.3 75.0
Ayeyawaddy 47.5 55.1 38.9 42.4 37.5 40.8 42.7 35.5
Notes:
1. Rice deficit areas include Sagaing Mandalay, Magwe and Taninthayi divisions, and Kachin, Kyin, Kaya, Shan and Rakhin states.
2. Surplus areas include Ayeyawaddy, Bago and Yangon divisions and Mon State. 
Source: MAPT.  
 
A seventh problem was that procurement quotas were virtually impossible to adjust. 
Officially quotas were to be determined at the township and district level based on the 
performance of the previous year and actual production conditions. However, it was almost 
impossible to set a target lower than the previous year without special reasons. There was 
continuous pressure from the top authorities to increase or at least maintain the total volume of 
procurement per area. 
An eighth problem, administrative operations at the village and township levels were 
greatly biased toward maintaining the procurement system which impeded the functioning of 
local administration. During the procurement process in the villages, not only MAPT personnel, 
but all administrative bodies in a local area were expected to be involved.16 They were all 
responsible for pressuring farmers to meet their quotas. Whenever local authorities found 
procurement operations lagging and the possibility of the target not being achieved, all the civil 
servants in the township were sent out to the villages to encourage the farmers to meet their 
procurement obligations. Finally, there was the problem of the quality of procured paddy. In 
response to the government’s low procurement price, farmers tended to deliver to the depots 
their lower quality paddy (such as that which was not fully dried or had been intentional mixed 
                                                  
16 Townships set up a special committee every year for promoting rice procurement during the harvest 
season. The chairman of this committee was the chairman of the Township Peace and Development 
Council. The MAPT township manager was the secretary, and other committee members consisted of 
officials from related ministries and organizations such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation. 
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 with foreign matter) and sold their better paddy on the free market. Another factor affecting 
quality was that paddy delivered to the depot was supposed to be separated into varieties, but in 
practice this separation was loosely controlled and different varieties became intermixed. Thus 
good quality paddy could become mixed with poor quality paddy leading to a lower grade of 
milled rice. The result was that the quality of procured paddy became a big problem, the same 
as it had been in the socialist period (Takahashi 1992, p.93-94). 
 
b. Problems at the Milling Stage 
The paddy collected from farmers was milled either at MAPT-owned rice mills or 
contracted to private mills. As of 2000/01, MAPT owned 68 mills mainly in the major rice 
producing areas. Most of them had been constructed in the 1980s with official development 
assistance (ODA) from Japan or other international organizations. Many of MAPT’s mills were 
large scale with a capacity of 100 tons of milled rice per day, while most private mills had a 
capacity of less than 50 tons per day. There was far more paddy procured than MAPT could 
handle at its own mills, so it contracted with private mills. Table 4 shows the share of milling by 
MAPT and private mills after liberalization began in 1987. The share for MAPT mills was only 
32% on average indicating the government’s great dependency on private mills. 
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 Table 4. Changes in the Share of Rice Milled by MAPT-Owned and MAPT-Contracted Mills. 
(in millions)
Procurement
Paddy Milled Rice Paddy Milled Rice
(baskets) (baskets) (tons) (baskets) (tons)
1988/89 85.10 14.70 0.18 46.10 0.58 24.18 71.4
1989/90 63.00 19.10 0.24 59.20 0.78 24.39 124.3
1990/91 72.10 19.60 0.24 40.40 0.53 32.67 83.2
1991/92 74.70 20.30 0.25 45.90 0.59 30.66 88.6
1992/93 76.50 25.00 0.31 57.70 0.75 30.23 108.1
1993/94 92.30 27.00 0.34 50.90 0.67 34.66 84.4
1994/95 97.30 32.10 0.40 76.50 0.97 29.56 111.6
1995/96 92.90 27.40 0.35 67.10 0.85 28.99 101.7
1996/97 73.00 22.60 0.28 49.90 0.65 31.17 99.3
1997/98 44.70 21.70 0.27 37.20 0.48 36.84 131.8
1998/99 105.30 26.20 0.33 46.00 0.61 36.29 68.6
1999/2000 105.83 30.90 0.38 53.30 0.69 36.70 79.6
2000/2001 101.74 28.10 0.35 51.80 0.67 35.17 78.5
Source: Tin Htut Oo and Kudo (2003, p.114)
Share of Milled
Rice in the Total
Procured Amount
(%)
Fiscal Year
MAPT Mills MAPT-Contracted Mills
Share for
MAPT Mills
（％）
 
 
One reason for the high dependency on private rice mills after liberalization, even with 
the decrease in the volume of procured rice, was the run-down condition of MAPT mills. These 
facilities could not be maintained or repaired after the halt of ODA following the government’s 
suppression of the democracy movement in 1988. Also the chronic shortage of electricity 
greatly lowered their rate of operation as most of MAPT’s mills were power by electricity. Some 
mills operated only 6-10 hours a day because of blackouts although they had 24-hour operating 
capacity.17
The biggest problem with the milling of procured paddy was the low milling fee paid to 
contracted private mills. It was half to one-third of the prevailing free market milling rate. For 
example, in 1998/99 the market milling fee was 20-30 kyat per basket while MAPT paid only 
10 kyat per basket. The government kept this low milling fee in order to curb the growing 
expenditures incurred by the state marketing sector. This meant that not only the farmers but 
also the private millers were burdened by the rice rationing system. 
                                                  
17 Based on the author’s interviews in Myaungmya in January 2002. 
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c. Problems Related to Rationing and Exporting 
The quality problem of procured paddy, which was pointed out above, had two results.  
First, although the rice ration system was a benefit to recipients in terms of volume and 
price, this was not sufficient enough to overcome the inferior quality of the rice, which led 
recipients to sell it to traders as feed for livestock rather than consume it at home.18 The 
increasing availability of a wide variety of rice at varying prices on the free market, as will be 
seen later, further accelerated this trend. Consequently, the rice ration system no longer worked 
as a benefit to its recipients as the government originally intended. 
Second, the inferior quality of procured paddy limited the destinations for exported 
Myanmar rice. A breakdown of Myanmar’s rice exports (Table 5) shows that most go to South 
Asia, Africa and Southeast Asia which have a large share of the world’s low-income countries 
where demand for low quality rice is high. Myanmar rice has failed to generate stable export 
demand because of its export regime which depended greatly on the state marketing sector. Due 
to the nature of the state marketing sector to place importance for quantity of supply rather than 
the quality, Myanmar was not able to meet demands for wide range of quality to expand the 
export.  
 
 
                                                  
18 Relatively affluent people tended to purchase rice on the black market during the socialist period. 
However, it is likely that the compulsory delivery system absorbed not only the surplus for sale but also 
part of the rice for home consumption of farmers. Therefore, the volume of rice sold in the black market 
could not have been large and most of the rationed rice was actually consumed during the socialist period. 
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 Table 5.　Breakdown of Myanmar Rice Exports
(%)
Destination 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/01
Southeast Asia 11.2 25.7 2.0 6.1 61.0 73.7 50.5 3.6 55.0 36.4 18.3
South Asia 49.3 26.2 37.7 18.8 9.5 7.3 21.5 96.4 15.8 41.8 69.3
the rest of Asia 0.0 4.9 0.0 3.1 0.0 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0
Africa 29.9 43.2 57.3 66.7 26.5 6.5 26.9 0.0 25.8 0.0 10.0
Middle East 2.2 0.0 3.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
North and South America 7.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 7.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Europe 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 1.5 0.0 1.1 0.0 2.5 21.8 2.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Statistical Yearbook (1997, 2001)  
 
2. The Private Rice Marketing Sector after the First Liberalization 
2.1 Development of Private Marketing Sector 
The rice ration system and its supporting procurement system were scaled back after the 
first liberalization, and the private sector came to play a larger role in supplying rice to the 
general consumer. The first liberalization abolished the restrictions on private millers and 
traders, and the geographical restrictions on rice trading that existed in the socialist period were 
basically lifted (Okamoto 2004, p.165-166). 
The shrinking of the state marketing sector along with the government’s policy in the 
1990s to raise rice production brought a steady increase in the volume of rice on the free 
market.19 The volume reached 30%-40% of total production by the end of the 1990s (Table 2).20 
                                                  
19 For analyses of the government’s policy to increase rice production in the 1990s, see Fujita ed. (2005, 
Chapter 5), Takahashi (2000) and Fujita (2003) and Kurosaki et al. (2004). 
20 This estimation is based on the official statistics. As Fujita points out (Fujita 2003, p. 310), there can be 
some upward bias in yields in official figures, especially since the late 1990s. The volume percentage 
shown here is based on the officially estimated average yield of around 60-65 baskets per acre since 
1995/96. However, according to field surveys by authors, there is a greater number of areas where the 
average yield for monsoon paddy is around 50 baskets per acre which is 20% lower than the official 
figures. Thus, if the estimation is made based on this 20% lower figure, the marketed volume of rice for 
2000/01 decreases from 46% to 27%. In this estimation, however, the calculation of home consumption 
does not differentiate between adults and children. Thus, the volume for home consumption could be less 
than these figures suggest. Therefore, the marketed volume for 2000/01 could have been between 27% 
and 46%. 
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 This section will examine how the private marketing sector developed in the midst of the 
increasing volume of marketed rice, focusing especially on the qualitative changes of the 
marketing system. 
One important change was the spread of marketing over wide areas of the country. 
Myanmar has a diversity of agronomic environments, and not every area of the country is 
suitable for rice cultivation. Therefore rice has to be transferred from surplus to deficit areas. 
The rice flows are shown in Figure 2.  
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure2. Flow of Rice
Source: Author.
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  The major commodity flows are from Lower to Upper Myanmar and Lower Myanmar 
to coastal areas. Rice is transferred via Upper Myanmar to the mountainous frontier areas. 
Yangon, the capital, functions as the central marketing point from which the flow of rice reaches 
3-3.4 million tons annually (average figure for 2000-2002) (MOAI, MIS, various issues), 
accounting for 34% of the total marketed volume per year indicated in Table 2. The rice 
assembled in Yangon is transferred to markets in Upper Myanmar and the coastal areas while 
also feeding the capital’s four million people. During the socialist period, only a scant volume of 
milled rice was marketed which had slipped through the mesh of government regulations. But 
now it is traded in large volumes over wide areas of the country. 
The price trend of rice in different areas of the country is another indication that rice is now 
being marketed over a wide area. Figure 3 shows the change in the price of rice of similar 
quality in six different areas. Yangon, Mawlyamyaine and Pyay are in rice surplus areas; 
Mandaly and Pakkoku are in rice deficit areas, while Taunggyi is an important 
collection/transfer market in a rice deficit mountainous area. Figure 3 shows that the prices in 
the six areas moved closely with each other, although the prices in deficit areas were higher than 
those of surplus areas as would be expected. 
Figure 3. Changes  in the Rice Prices  in Diiferent Areas(2002)
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 A second change was the entry of private rice millers and traders who expanded the 
volume of marketed rice. The number of private rice mills increased throughout the 1990s. This 
was mainly due to the sharp rise in the number of small mills in the villages (often called huller 
mills which have a capacity below 15 tons per day). The exact number of these small rice mills 
is not available, but there are normally one to five of them in each village tract. For example, in 
a township in Yangon Division, where the author conducted a survey, there were 200 of these 
small mills.21 The township has 64 village tracts, which would mean that each village tract had 
3.1 rice mills on average. Assuming that there are two rice mills in a village tract in the major 
rice producing areas (e.g., Ayeyarwaddy, Bago, Yangon and Mandalay divisions and Mon State), 
the total number of these small mills could be as high as 14,240. However, it is not unusual for a 
village tract to have more than 2 rice mills, so the above figure is a rather conservative estimate. 
The establishment of small rice mills was first permitted officially from around 1992/93; thus 
the dramatic increase in the number of these mills has taken place in the short time since then. 
Most of these mills handle paddy for home consumption in the villages, while only a few 
engage in milling for sale on the free market. The owners of these small mills are often farmers 
who do not have sufficient capital to invest a high quality machines. Thus, the efficiency of 
these mills is often low, and the quality of their milling poor. Oftentimes the rice they have 
milled, even when of the same variety, can be sold only at lower prices.22
Not only the rice millers, but a large number of traders also entered the rice market. 
According to the author’s survey of 47 wholesalers in eight major rice markets (Pathein, Pyapon, 
Mawlamyaingyun, Myaungmya, Yangon, Pyay, Mandalay, Pakkoku), 39 wholesalers (84.8%) 
began rice trading after liberalization in 1987, and only five (10.9%) were doing so before 
then.23 By far the greater share of rice traders entered the market after liberalization. The 
formation of marketing networks over wide areas of the country as well as the increase in the 
                                                  
21 Author’s survey in 1999. 
22 This is especially the case for the high quality rice. 
23 Author’s survey in 2002-2003. There was no pertinent information on the remaining two traders. 
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 volume of marketed rice produced by farmers encouraged the entry of traders, especially in the 
late 1990s. 
A third change was progress in the differentiation of rice varieties and production areas. 
This indicates a growing preference for high quality rice in Myanmar, although low- and 
medium-grade rice still predominates in the domestic market. The share for rice classified as 
Emata and Ngasein (classifications according to shape),24 which are two groups of low- and 
medium-grade rice, accounted for a high share of total production even in the 1990s (Figure 4); 
thus their share of marketed volume was also large.  
Figure 4.Changes in Rice Production ( according to classification by shape)
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24 In the British colonial period, rice was classified according to the nurturing duration at the farm level 
(Kaukkyi, Kauklat and Kaukyin for long, medium and short nurturing varieties). Myanmar’s rice traders 
adopted classifications according to shape (length and width), such as Emata, Ngasein, Midon, Letywezin 
and Byat (Cheng 1968, p.36-39; DOA 1936, p.12-14; MOAI 2004, p.46). These classifications continue 
to be used, but since the introduction of high yield varieties in the late 1970s, classification by variety 
name has become more common. However, the government’s procurement operations and the official 
statistics as well continue to be based on classification by shape. 
 
 22 
22
 It is rare for these two groups to be traded based on their individual variety names. Their 
prices are generally low (Figure 5), and the greatest demand for them comes from the low- and 
middle-income classes. The demand for rice of the Ngasein group, which is of low quality, is 
generally high in Upper Myanmar where a larger number of the country’s poor areas are located. 
Ngasein group rice is generally referred to as “rough” rice, but it is preferred by the poor 
because its volume increases when cooked. Rather than quality, these people want rice that fills 
the stomach. 
 
Figure 5 Changes in Wholesale Rice Price(in Yangon according to Group)
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Since the 1990s, differentiation by variety has progressed for some types of rice that have 
a certain added value. These are traded by individual variety name and not by group 
classification according to shape. Also their prices are determined by quality and production 
area. The best example is Pawsan Hmwe, a type of fragrant rice of high quality that is produced 
in the Ayeyarwaddy Delta. Pawsan Hmwe belongs to the Midon group when classified by shape. 
Looking at the price change for various types of rice (2000-2002), Pawsan Hmwe on average 
was 76% more expensive than Emata, but the price ranged from a maximum of 188% to a 
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 minimum of 24% higher (Figure 5). The price of Pawsan Hmwe differs depending on the area 
of production and quality. For example, that produced in Pyapon in Ayeyawaddy Division is 
regarded as high quality and is priced 10%-20% higher than the same rice of regular quality 
(MIS, 2002). 25  
The trend toward quality among consumers is most evident in Yangon which is the largest 
rice consuming area in the country. The brands of some wholesalers, especially those dealing in 
high quality rice, have come to be valued highly, and consumers now equate some specific 
brands with high quality. For this reason, some wholesalers in Yangon started to sell their rice in 
bags printed with their logos, a trend that became popular especially from the late 1990s. To 
secure the consumer’s trust wholesalers had to maintain high quality. This required them to 
select rice mills carefully and check the quality of milling when purchasing rice. 
In the past, rice was looked upon as a basic food, and there was less concern about quality. 
But consumers emerged who demanded better quality rice, and traders in large numbers 
responded to this demand. This significant change in the Myanmar economy came about with 
the development of private rice marketing following liberalization of the rice market sector. 
Fourth, changes in the means of transportation were an important factor for expanding the 
area of rice marketing in the 1990s. There was a substantial shift from water to land 
transportation. Water and rail transportation had been the major means of transportation in 
Myanmar since the colonial period. Even today when rice is transported directly from producing 
areas in the Delta to collection markets in Upper Myanmar, such as Pakkoku, water 
transportation is still widely used. In Yangon Division as well, about 50% of all rice is 
transported on waterways. 
However, if we look at the change in the absolute volume of rice shipped by water, by 
                                                  
25 While their price comparisons are not as detailed as for Pawsan Hmwe, there are other varieties in 
strong demand and which are priced by the name of the variety. Some examples are Shwebo Manaw (the 
variety preferred in Upper Myanmar and produced in Shwebo; it belongs to the Letywezin group), and 
Innma Yebow (the variety preferred in Shan State and which belongs to the Emata group). 
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 2001/02 it had decreased to one-fifth of that shipped in 1990/91,and to only one-tenth of that in 
1980/81 (Central Statistical Organization, 2002).26 In its place, truck transportation gained 
dramatically in importance during the 1990s. Behind this growth lay the gradual development of 
the country’s highway system. The total length of miles increased about 30% in the 11 years 
from 1990/91 to 2000/01 (Central Statistical Organization, 2002), and the number of trucks 
(second-hand) increased 40% during the same period. 
One clear reason for the rapid growth of land transportation was shortened 
transportation time. For example, if water transportation is used to move rice from the Delta to 
Pakokku, it takes well over one month, but it only takes several days if transported by truck. 
There are two benefits from the shortened transportation time. One is the lessened risk of 
deterioration in quality. If transported for a month in Myanmar’s scorching heat, the quality of 
rice is certain to deteriorate. However, if it is transported by truck, deterioration can be 
minimized. The second benefit is the acceleration of commodity turnover. This is quite apparent 
in transactions on the Yangon market where there are more traders wanting to collect payments 
as quickly as possible to use as capital for purchasing the next shipment of goods. With greater 
speed of commodity turnover, traders can increase the volume of their transactions. In this sense, 
the expansion of truck transportation has not only helped expand the area of marketing, but has 
also helped increase the volume of transactions and the profits of traders. 
A fifth change was the shift of traders from informal methods to using formal institutions 
for raising capital and settling accounts. Previously, most rice traders depended on loans from 
relatives and acquaintances for their working capital. Even for settling bills, they often utilized 
                                                  
26 About 21% of the rice shipped to Yangon was transported by truck to the Bayintnaung Market, 
according to the average figures for 2002 (MOAI, various monthly issues). The remaining 79% was 
shipped by water. Of the volume transported by water, 50% was sent from the Delta to the Lamadaw and 
Bodataung areas. The rice shipped to these areas is often reloaded onto trucks for transport to the 
Bayintnaung Market where many of the rice wholesalers have their stores. Thus, along with the 
development of the road system in the Delta, the truck transportation has increased to avoid the reloading 
process. 
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 the informal remittance system called “Hondi”,27 or if not they accompanied the commodity and 
paid the price directly. However, after the government allowed the establishment of private 
banks in the early 1990s, 20 private banks came into existence in the country. Further, branch 
networks expanded even into some rural areas, and account settlement through banks increased 
quite dramatically. In one rural area (Pakkoku), a new 21-day short-term loan scheme with an 
upper limit of three million kyat was introduced to provide working capital to local rice traders. 
However, this scheme continued only up to the early 2000s. After the financial crisis in 2003, 
large banks were forced to close. This seriously hampered utilization of the banking sector for 
loans and account settlements, and many traders reverted to relying on informal loans and 
remittances. The development of the financial sector has yet to recover from this setback. 
One more change was the development of infrastructure for conducting transactions, 
especially on the Yangon market. The Myanmar Rice Wholesalers Association took over 
responsibility for managing the rice trading center in Yangon and helped improve the market’s 
efficiency and the environment for conducting transactions. The rice trading center is open to 
anyone who pays the entrance and annual fees, the number of members has been increasing 
annually (it had 6,000 members in 2002). In 2003, 500-600 traders visited the center every 
morning and transactions took place through negotiations with traders presenting different 
samples of rice. The center keeps records of the daily prices and volumes of rice traded, and 
these records are provided to the rice traders and to government organizations. This helps 
traders to judge the current market condition at least for Yangon market. 
 
                                                  
27 In this system the amount of money for a transaction is not paid to the seller directly, but to the hondi 
agent located in the area where the buyer lives. The hondi agent in the seller’s area pays the amount to the 
seller after receiving confirmation from the agent in the buyer’s area that the amount has been received. 
The money the hondi agents use for payment is the money that has accrued from previous transactions for 
other traders. Therefore, for the system to function, there have to be various kinds of commodity 
transactions taking place for the hondi agents on both sides. 
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 2.2 Problems that Private Rice Marketing Sector Has Faced 
In the previous section we noted various positive aspects of private rice marketing in 
Myanmar after the first liberalization. However, there were also problems in the development 
process, and these were closely bound with the official rationale of the rice marketing system 
which was the maintaining of a stable rice supply at a low price. The private rice marketing 
sector did not dare to interfere with this rationale. Consequently, the sector had to limit the 
scope of its transaction activities to dealing in the government’s procurement operations (for the 
Budget Group) and to the domestic rice market. This next section will discuss the problems for 
rice millers. This will be followed by a discussion of those faced by rice traders. 
 
a. Problems Facing Rice Millers 
It was pointed out earlier that there was a remarkable rise of small rice mills in rural areas 
in Myanmar. However, contrastingly enough, mid and large-scale rice mills (mills with milling 
capacity more than 16 tons of rice per day) decreased in numbers. Table 6 indicates the changes 
in the number of MAPT registered mid-and large rice mills.  
 
Table 6. Number of Mid- and Large-scale Private Mills Registered with MAPT
State・Division 1998/99 2000/01 1998/99 2000/01
（％） （％）
Ayeyawaddy 489 369 47.2 53.7
Bago 208 133 20.1 19.4
Yangon 123 69 11.9 10.0
Mon 66 32 6.4 4.7
Rakhine 5 4 0.5 0.6
Sagaing 49 41 4.7 6.0
Mandalay 68 11 6.6 1.6
Magwe 6 0 0.6 0.0
Kachin 8 10 0.8 1.5
Tanintaryi 2 2 0.2 0.3
Kaya 11 16 1.1 2.3
Total 1035 687 100.0 100.0
Source: MAPT, Tin　Htut　Oo & Kudo (2003, Annex 7)  
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The figures show that the number of these rice mills decreased greatly in only two years. 
Another example of this big drop comes from the author’s 1999 survey. There were 13 mid- and 
large-scale rice mills in a township in Yangon Division, but only seven of the mills were 
actually operating. The other six had closed down. 
The great majority of these big rice mills had been established during the British colonial 
period or the socialist period. Those opened during the colonial period had played a primary role 
in making Myanmar one of the giant rice exporters of the world. However, when rice exporting 
became a government monopoly in the socialist period, these rice mills were required to mill the 
government procured paddy at the official fixed rate, though they were not nationalized in the 
strict sense. After the first liberalization in 1987, these mid- and large-scale mills also started 
operating in the private rice market. But business was difficult because of their large capacity.  
The main reason that the rice mills closed down in the township stated above was capacity 
underutilization. 
One reason for this underutilization was the decreasing demand for milling at mid- and 
large-scale rice mills. The rapid increase in the number of small mills in the villages following 
the first liberalization reduced the need to transport paddy to the distant big mills and their rate 
of operation declined. Before liberalization the rice for rural household consumption was milled 
at the big mills located in town. But during the 1990s this rice came to be processed mostly at 
the newly established village mills, and the big town mills lost business. Competition also arose 
from some rice traders, especially from those in Pathein and Myaungmya in Ayeyarwaddy 
Division, who procured paddy over a wide area. These traders set up their own rice mills. As 
noted earlier, the rice price can fluctuate widely on the Yangon market, and the timing of 
transactions has a big impact on the profit of traders. If the rice sent to Yangon has to be milled 
at one of the big mills, traders sometimes have to wait their turn which can make them miss the 
best timing for a sale. To avoid this problem, some traders set up their own mills, even if these 
were small. Given the downward trend in the demand for milling at mid- and large-scale rice 
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 mills, and in an effort to raise their rate of operation, some of these big mills turned from the 
specialization on custom milling and started regular milling whereby the mill bought up and 
milled paddy at its own expense and then sold the rice itself. This was another indication of the 
unfavorable business conditions facing the big rice mills. 
A second problem for mid- and large-scale rice mills was that the milling of MAPT paddy 
often became a burden both financially and physically. Even though MAPT bore the cost of 
labor for the milling of its paddy, big mills contracted by MAPT still often found that milling for 
the organization did not pay. The mills also needed to handle all the cumbersome procedures to 
abide by the requirement that MAPT prescribed.28 There were also cases where MAPT required 
mills to store its paddy or milled rice for medium to long periods without paying any charges. 
These mills were then hard pressed to find space to store their own rice or paddy. From the 
statistical figures, government dependency of rice storage on the private sector is less than 10% 
(Okamoto 2004, p.170). However, considering the above examples of required storage, it was 
very likely more than that. All these difficulties made the big rice mills reluctant to contract with 
MAPT. Table 7 shows the change in the number of mills contracted by MAPT to mill 
government procured paddy. It has been declining over the past decade. This can be interpreted 
as reflecting the general reluctance of private rice mills to contract with MAPT.29
 
                                                  
28 One example of the quality check burden was the report that even though contracts prescribed a rate of 
25% for broken rice, millers were sometimes required to meet a rate of 15% at the time of quality 
inspections.  
29 The year 2001/02, although showing a decline, was not an ordinary year. MAPT increased rice exports 
that year, and it had to contract with more private mills for these exports. To attract mills, it raised its 
milling fee to 30 kyat per basket which was close to the market rate. This attracted even those mills that 
had never contracted with MAPT before. Thus the figure for contracted mills in 2001/02 was likely rather 
higher than it otherwise would have been. MAPT also resorted to coercive methods to employ mills. In 
some areas it notified mill owners that their milling licenses would be revoked if they refused to contract 
with MAPT. 
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 Table 7. Number of Private Mills Contrated to Mill MAPT Paddy
Division/State 1991/92 1995/96 1998/99 2000/01
Ayeyawaddy 220 208 144 138
Bago 173 136 100 51
Yangon 75 61 49 38
Mon 40 37 30 43
Rakhine 19 15 12 0
Sagaing 101 81 78 68
Mandalay 56 66 38 39
Magwe 32 19 20 15
Kachin 20 25 14 14
Tanintaryi 19 14 12 17
Kayin 9 1 1 0
Kaya 1 1 1 0
Tota; 765 664 499 423
Source: MAPT, Tin　Htut　Oo & Kudo (2003, Annex 5)  
 
While the long-term trend of private rice mills has been away from MAPT, there are mills 
that find a benefit in contracting to mill MAPT’s procured paddy. One reason is that they can at 
least secure a certain amount of paddy to continue operating. With general demand decreasing 
for milling at mid- and large-scale mills, they need to find ways to keep themselves running. It 
is a rather passive response. But they have workers to pay, and they see it as better to get 
whatever paddy they can to keep operating. Another reason is the deterioration and 
obsolescence of their milling facilities. These mills have found that they cannot meet the quality 
demanded of rice for sale on the free market. However, when milling for MAPT, the quality is 
less important. These are rice mills that are less inclined to expand their business or improve 
quality, so they are willing to contract with MAPT. Most of the rice mills that have closed down 
in recent years have been these sorts of passive operators who have relying mainly on milling 
MAPT paddy for their business. 
But the biggest problem facing the mid- and large-scale mills is the dilapidated condition 
of their milling facilities and equipment. Important parts of these mills, such as engines, are now 
very old and have been in use since the 1930s; the most recent are from the 1960s. A survey by 
the author of mid- and large-scale mill in Ayeyarwaddy Division in 2002 found that even those 
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 millers who had started business after the 1987 liberalization had often not constructed 
completely new mills; rather they had made use of second-hand equipment or had purchased old 
mills. In the survey, there were 22 mid- and large-scale mills; seven of them were new entrants 
into the business, but only two of these were constructing new facilities. The other five had 
purchased old, second-hand mills. Even with new ownership, the cost and maintenance of 
running these old, second-hand mills with their worn-out equipment can be very high. But no 
support or assistance for maintenance or improving efficiency has been forthcoming from the 
government despite its dependence on the big mills for milling state procured paddy.30
In the view of most of the big rice mills, any substantial investment to upgrade facilities 
and improve quality will not pay given that the market is still dominated by trading in medium 
and low quality rice. Replacing their steam engines with electric motors would in all likelihood 
lower their rate of operation because of the chronic shortage of electricity. The limited supply of 
spare parts at reasonable cost and sufficient quality has also detracted from the willingness of 
millers to undertake new investment. The great majority of mid- and large-scale millers say that 
they are ready to undertake new investment once private rice exporting is allowed and the 
market for high quality rice expands. This clearly indicates that the present condition of 
Myanmar’s rice market, characterized by government restrictions on exporting and the 
dominance of low and medium quality rice, has narrowed the business opportunities for big rice 
millers, and this in turn has narrowed their business perspective. 
 
b. Problems Facing Rice Traders 
The first liberalization gave rice traders the freedom to deal in the domestic rice market, 
and this new market environment encouraged the entry of new rice traders. However, this new 
freedom was only on the condition that their dealings did not jeopardize the government’s rice 
policy. Herein lay the nature of the first liberalization. Rice traders were not entirely free from 
                                                  
30 During the socialist period, there was some loan assistance to private mills from the Asian 
Development Bank. 
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 government intervention. There were three situations where the government intervened in the 
domestic rice market. 
One was when rice transactions were done with remote regions. In general after the first 
liberalization, there were no longer any restrictions on the marketing of rice over a wide area of 
the country. However, transactions with some remote regions bordering neighboring countries 
were an exception. These regions were Shan, Chin and Rakhine states, and Tanintharyi Division. 
For any rice transactions with these regions, it was necessary to get permission from the local 
authorities (the State or Division Peace and Development Council). For some regions, there was 
a set monthly quota for the volume of rice to be transacted.31 The rationale of this regulation, of 
course, was to keep the domestic rice price stable. With Myanmar’s domestic rice price kept far 
below the international price, if sizable amounts of rice were exported (even informally) to the 
neighboring countries of Thailand, China, India and Bangladesh, there would be inevitable 
upward pressure on the domestic rice price. To prevent this, the authorities made every effort to 
strictly regulate the volume of rice transacted with these remote regions. This regulation actually 
made the people in these regions, which are rice deficit areas, pay a high price in relative terms 
for the rice they consumed.32 Nevertheless, the government put tight controls on the transactions 
of rice with these remote regions because it placed top priority on maintaining a stable price for 
the domestic rice market as a whole. 
The second situation was when the volume of procured rice fell below the government’s 
                                                  
31 For example, when rice wholesalers in Tanintharyi procured rice from Yangon, they had to submit the 
planned amount of procurement to the Tanintharyi Peace and Development Council every month. At the 
same time, the selling trader in Yangon also had to submit it to the Yangon Peace and Development 
Council. In the case of northern Shan State, buying traders in the state had to submit the volume of 
purchase to the Mandalay Peace and Development Council where the selling traders were located. For the 
sale of rice to traders in Chin State, traders had to submit the transacted amounts to the Peace and 
Development Councils where both the buying and selling traders were located. In Rakhine State as well, 
there were strict regulations when rice was transferred to townships in the northern part of the state. (This 
information is based on field surveys done by author in 2001-03). 
32 According to the author’s survey in 2001, the retail rice price in these remote regions was higher by 
10%-20% compared to the average rice deficit area in Upper Myanmar. 
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 target. There was an unwritten rule, even when the harvest was normal, that traders could not 
buy paddy or rice from farmers who had not met their procurement quotas for that year. 
However, when procurement was not progressing well in an area, the government often 
prohibited all private sales of paddy or rice in that area. In the rice deficit remote regions 
discussed above, the government generally did not permit such sales during the procurement 
season. 
The third situation was when an abrupt rise took place in the rice price. The government 
was noticeably wary about depending on the private sector for the marketing of rice. This was 
because it basically viewed traders as evil,33and the private sector has often been blamed for 
hikes in the price of rice.34 Whenever the authorities judged that the rice price had gone above 
the level they could tolerate, government officials were ordered to start inspecting rice traders in 
various parts of the country, in both rural and urban areas. Taking one extreme example, in 
                                                  
33 Kikuchi (1998) points out that the view still persists in many countries that traders exploit producers 
and consumers, and governments use this to legitimize their intervention in the market. Myanmar is very 
much an example of this. 
34 The following quotes from a speech by a high ranking official clearly shows the stance of the present 
government on the marketing of rice. “. . . . The price of rice should not be raised because of the scarcity 
of rice or exporting. The central authorities sent directives to the concerned local authorities to ensure that 
rice is transported freely, that the transport and flow of rice are not controlled, and that rice mills and 
hullers are not closed down. . . . . There was instability in the price of rice in February [2002]. That was 
because of paddy being stored by some private rice mills in the townships, the manipulation of market 
[rice] price and rumors about government purchases of rice for export, and the storage of rice by those 
who are not rice merchants. There are some conditions in which the purchase and sale of rice cannot be 
regarded as merely a business undertaking. An unstable or soaring rice price is sometimes linked to 
unscrupulous instigations. Stability in the price of rice is linked to the need of the people for food, 
clothing and shelter, and to the stability of the State. Therefore, it can be assumed that there will always 
be the danger of destructionist existing in the paddy and rice trade. Moreover, whenever there has been an 
unusual occurrence and instability, some merchants in Myanmar, who have no scruples about the interests 
of the nation and the people, have taken advantage of the situation and have served their own 
self-interests by exorbitantly hiking the prices of rice, edible oil, gold, silver and other commodities. The 
manipulation of commodity prices is harmful and a burden on the grass-roots-level workers who live 
hand to mouth, on the poor and government personnel; and it must be prevented.” 
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 August 2002, when the price of rice sky-rocketed, the government instructed rice traders in 
Bayint Naung Market in Yangon to sell rice below the market price (500 kyat below per 50 
kilogram bag) for distribution to the poor. Later, other wholesalers in the market were told to 
provide another 1.5 tons of rice per trader for free because the previous amount had not been 
sufficient to cover the distribution. The effect of this government action was the equivalent of 
150,000 kyat suddenly being seized from the traders. This episode suggests that, compared to 
other commodities, the rice market in Myanmar faces a much higher risk of sudden, unexpected 
intervention by the government. One rice trader commenting on the government’s stance on rice 
said, “If you want to make a profit, don’t go into rice trading; choose some other business.”35  
Rice traders have to accept such intervention because the government has not changed its stance 
against an unstable rice price. 
 
3. The Second Liberalization 
The second liberalization in 2003 abolished the rice rationing system for the Budget 
Group and the paddy procurement system that took from the farmers. Forty-two years after the 
establishment of Myanmar’s socialist government, the domestic rice market was finally 
completely liberalized. MAPT, long the main organization responsible for the rice procurement 
and rationing systems, lost its purpose for existing. Sizable reduction began in its personnel, and 
its rice mills were put up for sale. 
As with the first liberalization, the second liberalization went through twists and turns as it 
progressed. Initially the procurement system was to be abolished, but the rice rationing system 
for the Budget Group was to be retained by relying on procurements from rice traders paid at 
the market price. However, just before procurements were to start, the government realized that 
it would be difficult to cover the whole cost of rice procured at the market price, and in the early 
2004, it suddenly announced that the rice rationing system was to be abolished. To compensate 
                                                  
35 From the author’s interviews with rice wholesalers in Yangon in August 2002. 
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 government personnel for the loss of rationed rice, each person would receive a payment of 
5,000 kyat per month.36
One of the main components of the original reform plan in 2003 was opening rice 
exporting to private traders. The idea was to issue export licenses to private exporters within a 
quota set annually by the government, and the government would take half of the foreign 
exchange earnings (it was equal to the 45% of the total earning after the deduction of the 10% 
export tax). In turn, the government would pay the marketing cost equivalent to 45% exported 
rice in local currency, kyats. After the second liberalization, export licenses actually issued were 
for 0.5 million tons of rice, out of which 0.27 million tons were actually exported. However, this 
private rice exporting was halted at the same time that the rice rationing system was abolished 
in January 2004. 
The government’s original objective in the second liberalization was likely to earn a larger 
amount of foreign exchange through rice exporting. As pointed out earlier, it appears that from 
the late 1990s, the government sought to export larger volumes of rice by increasing the 
volumes procured from the farmers. However, it seems that this effort did not work as planned, 
and apparently the government decided to try another way, which was to earn more foreign 
exchange by increasing rice exports via the private sector.37    
Behind this increased importance on exporting was the government feeling that the 
                                                  
36 If we calculate using the market rice price for Emata in January 2004, this amount of compensation 
would be equivalent to 16 pyi (33.6 kg), an amount of rice larger than compared to when public workers 
received 12 pyi under the rationing system. However, January is normally the time of the year when the 
rice price is lowest, so this amount of compensation would not necessarily assure them of the same 
amount of rice throughout the year. Moreover, some ministries also halted the rationing of other items, 
such as eggs and edible oil. Therefore, it has been argued that this monetary compensation in place of the 
ration system was actually a reduction in the real salaries of public workers. 
37 Private rice millers and wholesalers also became members of the Rice Trading Leading Committee, 
which was in charge of the reform. This indicates that the government had become more attentive to 
motivating the private sector to become involved in rice exporting with the hope that this would 
ultimately enlarge the government’s export earnings. This effort was epoch making, as Myanmar’s 
economic policy has by and large always been decided in top-down style. 
 35 
35
 domestic rice price was more or less under control. Thanks to its aggressive rice production 
policy during the 1990s, the rice supply on the domestic market had steadily increased, although 
the profitability of rice traders had deteriorated over the same period. The direct result of this 
was the collapse of the rice price in 2000-2001. In 2002 the price started to rise again, but this 
was a temporary phenomenon caused by the farmers’ strong reluctance to sow paddy in 
response to the price collapse, as well as by the fall in production due to the unfavorable 
weather that year. By 2003 the rice price started to stabilize, and it is very possible that the 
government saw this as a good time to start deregulating private rice exporting. 
However, the decision to abolish rice rationing and replace it with fixed cash payments 
had ramifications. If these payments were as the only compensation for the cost of rice, very 
likely discontent would break out among civil servants and military personnel if the price of rice 
went up even just a little. This was a real concern because there were signs that price increases 
would accompany export liberalization. This possibility unnerved the government, and it 
decided to freeze private rice exporting 38  The reform plan was then modified without 
discussions with the private sector. In the end, the stable supply of rice at a low price had top 
priority. The fundamental rationale of government rice policy prevailed over earning a larger 
amount of foreign exchange.39  
As for the rice procurement system, the reason it was abolished was that it no longer 
yielded the benefits to match the cost of retaining it. This was an indirect effect of the low rice 
price as a result of increased rice production. Because of the depressed domestic market price, 
rice production in general suffered a deterioration in profitability. This increased the difficulty of 
sustaining the procurement system because the government had to procure paddy at a price even 
                                                  
38 Along with rice, the export of chilies, onions, maize and sesame were also banned. This also reflected 
the high priority that the government put on self-sufficiency in important crops. 
39 However, the rice for the military (excluding family members) is procured separately. For 2003/04, 
each army command set quotas for traders in some producing areas. However, there are no clear details 
about how this procurement system operates. 
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 lower than the repressed market price. Added to this was MAPT’s deficit which had begun to 
widen again from the late 1990s.40 The situation was beginning to resemble the adverse 
conditions for the rice sector at the end of the socialist period. Worse still, even with greater 
government effort to secure rationed rice, the recipients were finding little merit in it because of 
its generally low quality, a problem hampering the expansion of exports as well. Ultimately with 
the abolition of rice rationing, the need for the procurement system totally disappeared. 
The significance of the second liberalization in deregulating domestic rice marketing un 
Myanmar cannot be overemphasized, and it is expected to have three effects. First, the 
profitability of rice production is expected to improve along with an increased awareness among 
farmers for quality. By benefiting from an appropriate level for the price of rice on the market, 
the profitability of rice production, and thus farmers’ income, can be expected to improve. In 
marginal rice producing areas where rice is grown mainly for home consumption, it is expected 
to lead to the reduction of rice purchased on the market. At the same time, the sale of rice on the 
market is expected to increase by 10%-20% and rice production will become more market 
oriented. This will make farmers more concerned about the quality of the rice they produce. The 
second effect of this liberalization is a reduction in the number of situations where the 
government will abruptly intervene in the market. This will reduce transaction costs for private 
rice traders. Thirdly, inefficiency in the rice marketing system arising from heavy-handed 
government intervention will be reduced. The procurement system carried with it numerous 
political and economical costs and also was a breeding ground for corruption. Its abolition is 
expected to lead to improvements in economic efficiency as a whole. 
However, the failure to open rice exporting to private traders following the second 
liberalization is a big setback for the rice marketing sector in Myanmar from a mid- to long-term 
perspective. Rice traders were very much anticipating export deregulation and were greatly 
disappointed when it failed to take place. More than 20 export companies were set up in 
                                                  
40 See footnote 12. 
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 preparation for liberalization, but these efforts have gone totally for naught. Though the 
government said the freeze on exporting was only temporary, it still has not been put back on 
the policy agenda even after the passage of two years. The government’s fickleness on the 
export issue has intensified rice trader non-confidence in the government, and traders are 
increasingly taking a risk adverse attitude toward new investment in facilities and the expansion 
of business. Without doubt this is very much dampening the future outlook for the rice 
marketing sector in Myanmar. 
 
Conclusion 
The stable supply of rice at a low price continued to be the principal rationale of the rice 
marketing system in Myanmar even after the two liberalizations of the rice marketing system. 
The transition from comprehensive state control over rice marketing that began with the first 
liberalization and continued with the second can be seen as an ad hoc transformation of the 
marketing system. The transformation proceeded with twists and turns in response to the 
changing economic and political situation, and eventually took the form of gradual rice price 
deregulation. 
The major reason for the collapse of comprehensive state control over the rice marketing 
system of the socialist period was because of deteriorating productivity and fiscal stress that 
made it difficult to sustain the low-rice-price rationing system targeting the whole population. 
There was a contradiction inherent in the system. It had been set up for the purpose of avoiding 
political instability, but ultimately it came to be the cause of social instability in the countryside. 
The first liberalization became caught up in the political turmoil of the big 
democratization movement in 1988, and this determined the process of its implementation. The 
government decided that rice rationing to civil servants and military personnel, whose support 
underpinned the political regime, was indispensable, and to secure the rice for this rationing, the 
paddy procurement system was revived. To placate the general consumers who were excluded 
from the new rationing system, the government attempted to keep the domestic rice price far 
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 below the international price by controlling rice exports. This was done by maintaining the 
government’s monopoly on all rice exporting. Initially these measures were generally successful 
in maintaining the supply of rice at a low price while allowing the government to avoid 
scrutinizing the defects inherent in the state marketing system, such as the diminishing 
economic welfare of the farmers and deteriorating quality of rice. Whenever it became difficult 
to keep the rice price sufficiently low, the government without hesitation resorted to intervention 
in the operations of the private sector of the rice market. At the same time, the government 
continued to feel that it could depend heavily on the private sector whenever it found the need to 
do so. Thus one is led to the conclusion that although the government embarked on its first 
liberalization of the economy in 1987, its policy lacked all perspective for promoting the private 
marketing of rice. 
Satisfied that the domestic rice market had largely stabilized, the government began its 
second liberalization effort in 2003, reviving its objective of expanding rice exports to increase 
the state’s foreign exchange earnings. The reform also did away with the long-standing rice 
procurement and ration systems that were having negative economic and social effects. 
However, just as the liberalization was to be implemented, the stability of rice supply at a low 
price to general consumers again took first priority, and the government postponed the start of 
private rice exportation. Consequently, the second liberalization can be characterized as a 
transformation of Myanmar’s rice marketing system from one supported by the rice 
procurement and ration systems and export controls to one solely dependent on rice export 
controls. 
Under the government’s policy framework, private rice marketing was allowed to develop 
only in the remaining sphere of the rice marketing sector and on condition that it did not 
jeopardize the stable supply of rice at a low price. This was the inevitable consequence of the 
rationale for Myanmar’s rice marketing policy. In the liberalization process, however, the 
private rice marketing sector was able to achieve self-sustaining development. The 
government’s policy to promote rice production and cutbacks in the volume of rice procurement 
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 increased the amount of rice sold in the market which induced more traders to enter the rice 
marketing business. At the same time there was improvement in infrastructure in the areas of 
transportation, market facilities and financial services which are indispensable for an efficient 
marketing system. These improvements enabled the establishment of a rice marketing system 
that expanded over a wide area of the country, clearly demonstrating the latent willingness of 
Myanmar’s traders to grasp whatever small opportunities arose to increase profits, opportunities 
that had been closed off for the more than quarter century of the socialist period. The rice 
traders who expanded business while avoiding conflicts with the government’s rice policy were 
the ones who could survive during the 1990s. 
By the end of the 1990s, however, the private rice marketing sector had reached a 
crossroads as the domestic rice market approached the point of total saturation. This problem 
was most evident in the tough business conditions facing mid- and large-scale rice millers. The 
decrepitude and worn-out state of their mills grew apace, but they could not risk venturing into 
new investments under the existing market structure where low and medium quality rice was in 
most demand. Even in the milling of lower quality rice, the big mills were losing out to the 
growing number of small-scale rice mills in the villages. Thus, by the time of the second 
liberalization, mid- and large-scale rice mills were facing a crisis in their business operations. 
The commercial and processing industries of Myanmar’s rice marketing sector continue 
to be based on the rural economy of the country. In neighboring Thailand, rice millers turned to 
exporting, and with that accumulated capital, they expanded their business to other industries 
with great success (Usui and Mishima ed. 1994, p.98). In Myanmar as well, one would hope 
that the same scenario could play out of the private rice traders and millers. However, in reality 
there is little prospect that private rice exporting will be allowed in the near future.41 The 
present government is unlikely to change the rationale of its rice policy that prioritizes a low 
price for the sake of political stability. If export controls become the sole direct policy tool that 
                                                  
41 It is reported that some companies has obtained export license in 2005. However, it is limited to 
only a number of companies and exporting amount is not large, either. It should be regarded that 
they are allowed to export in line with the decrease of rice exports through MAPT. 
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 the government has for keeping the price of rice low, the government will remain reluctant to 
undertake any rapid deregulation of rice exports. This means that the private rice marketing 
sector will have to survive within the confines of the present domestic market which limits the 
demand largely to the low and medium quality rice. Thus the government’s rice policy and its 
primary rationale have again thwarted the development of Myanmar’s private rice marketing 
sector and its potential to stimulate growth in the economy as a whole. 
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